A British company director has received a custodial sentence of four years and eight months following conviction for orchestrating an extensive fraud involving the sale of counterfeit aircraft engine parts valued at approximately £7 million.
Jose Alejandro Zamora Yrala, 38, operated AOG Technics from his home office in Surrey, supplying an estimated 60,000 components for CFM56 engines with forged documentation between 2019 and 2023.
The CFM56 engine, manufactured by CFM International, represents the world’s most widely utilised aircraft engine platform. The component operates across multiple variants of the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 aircraft, alongside several larger commercial aviation platforms. The scale of Zamora Yrala’s operation extended to direct sales to airlines, maintenance and repair organisations, and aircraft parts brokers operating across numerous jurisdictions.
Judge Simon Picken characterised the defendant’s conduct as constituting a “more or less complete undermining” of regulatory frameworks established to maintain passenger flight safety. The Serious Fraud Office investigation revealed that Zamora Yrala employed multiple methodologies to sustain the fraudulent operation. Authorised Release Certificates, which serve as critical documentation certifying the airworthiness of new or refurbished components, were systematically falsified. Certain certificates originated from a technician employed by an airline who modified genuine documents using computer editing software, whilst additional forgeries were created in collaboration with a Spanish graphic designer.
The fraudulent scheme incorporated fabricated sourcing documentation intended to conceal the actual origin of supplied components. Zamora Yrala created fictitious employees and instituted a comprehensive false identity structure, whereby communications from fictitious sales managers and quality assurance personnel were transmitted to clients to reinforce the appearance of legitimate commercial operations. Court testimony established that the company’s actual personnel comprised solely Zamora Yrala himself, his former spouse, her brother, and the family’s domestic employee.
The discovery of the fraud in 2023 precipitated significant disruption across the global aviation sector. The initial detection occurred when an engineer employed by Portuguese airline TAP questioned the authenticity of a component encountered during maintenance procedures. Subsequent manufacturer verification confirmed the documentation as fraudulent, triggering a cascade of investigations and corrective actions. Grounding operations were implemented across the United Kingdom and internationally, necessitating comprehensive engine inspections and systematic component replacement programmes. Affected carriers included Ryanair, American Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines, and TAP Air Portugal, amongst others.
The Serious Fraud Office calculated overall losses resulting from this fraud at £39.3 million. Notably, the true provenance of the 60,000 suspect components entering the global aviation supply chain remains indeterminate, presenting an ongoing challenge to aviation safety authorities and industry stakeholders.
Harriet Sassoon, case controller at the Serious Fraud Office, stated: “It is almost impossible to identify where parts sold with forged certificates came from.” This statement underscores the systemic vulnerability exposed by the fraud and the difficulties inherent in retrospectively establishing component authenticity within complex supply chains.
In addition to his custodial sentence, Zamora Yrala received a director disqualification order spanning eight years. The court has scheduled proceedings regarding proceeds of crime recovery for later in the year. A complementary investigation conducted by Portuguese authorities remains ongoing.
This case exemplifies the critical importance of robust supply chain verification mechanisms within aviation manufacturing and maintenance sectors. The incident demonstrates that regulatory frameworks, however stringent in design, remain vulnerable to sophisticated falsification when executed by determined actors operating within the system. Industry participants must consider enhanced verification protocols and third-party authentication mechanisms as essential components of operational governance.
